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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FOREWORD: THE CRIMINAL-CIVIL
DISTINCTION AND DANGEROUS
BLAMELESS OFFENDERS
PAUL H. ROBINSON*
Our legal system distinguishes criminal law from civil law, and
criminal commitment from civil commitment. We speak of a
"crime," rather than a "violation" or a "breach," and "punishment," rather than "sanction" or "liability." Why is criminal law
kept distinct? One can conceive of a system in which no such criminal-civil distinction exists. An actor who commits a violation of the
legal rules of conduct (not a "crime") would have jurisdiction taken over
him (not "convicted"), during which time he would be corrected or
sanctioned (but not "punished"). Under this system, what is now
dealt with as criminal law would be treated as just another aspect of
civil law. In fact, because it is not unusual for different aspects of
civil law to have different procedures, perhaps even current criminal
procedures could be followed. Some academics have proposed just
such a system, 1 although I know of no society in which such a system
currently operates. Why are societies persistent in maintaining a
distinct system labelled as "criminal"?
Criminal law is not unique in the conduct it punishes; some
conduct violates criminal and civil law. 2 Nor is criminal law unique
in the deprivations that it imposes; civil commitment, tort law, and a
variety of other civil measures can deprive a person of his or her
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. The author wishes to
acknowledge the useful criticisms of participants at a faculty workshop at Northwestern
University School of Law.
1 See, e.g., BARBARA WooTroN, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW chs. 2-3 (1963); Jay
Campbell, A Strict Accountability Approach to Criminal Responsibility, 29 FED. PROBATION,
Dec. 1965, at 33; SHELDON GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY ch. 4 (1963).
2 In this Article, the phrase "civil law" refers to all law that is not criminal. That is,
the criminal-civil distinction is taken to be comprehensive in its coverage. Other defini-

tions of "civil law" are possible, of course.
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liberty, put restrictions on what a person can do, and compel the
payment of money. If criminal law is not unique in either the conduct it prohibits or the deprivations it dispenses, why is it kept distinct?
Its existence must have an explanation apart from its
prohibitions, deprivations, or procedures.
Conventional lay wisdom holds that criminal liability and criminal commitment are different from civil liability and civil commitment in that the former generally reflect moral blameworthiness
deserving condemnation and punishment, while this is not necessarily so for the latter. 3 The notion that the distinctiveness of criminal
law is its focus on moral blameworthiness, is supported by the traditional requirements for criminal liability, which as a group are not
characteristic of civil liability.
Criminal law addresses only harms of a sufficient seriousness;
situations analogous to civil law's liability-with-nominal-damages
typically do not result in criminal liability. Under the Model Penal
Code's "de minimis infraction" defense, for example: "The Court
shall dismiss a prosecution if ... it finds that the defendant's conduct... did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to
be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only to an
extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction

....

-"4 In the

same vein, the Code distinguishes "crimes" from "violations": "A
violation does not constitute a crime and conviction of a violation
shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on
conviction of a criminal offense." 5 Thus, parking violations, infractions of motor vehicle codes, and other such transgressions generally are not "crimes," although they are enforced by the same
officers who enforce the criminal law.
Also characteristic of criminal law is the fact that an actor generally must have a culpable state of mind. Bringing about a prohibited
harm or evil, even wrongfully, is not itself sufficient for criminal liability. Generally, a minimum of recklessness is required as to every
offense element; 6 that is, an actor must have some degree of awareness of the facts that make his or her conduct criminal. Still higher
culpability, consisting of knowledge or purpose, commonly is required as to one or more offense elements. Lower culpability than
3 This Article does not address the issue of whether tort law or other aspects of civil
law are or should be guided by notions of moral desert.
4 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12(2) (1985) (emphasis added). Where the damage is minor under civil law, in contrast, liability nonetheless is imposed but only nominal damages are awarded.
5 Id. § 1.04(5). See id. for a definition of what constitutes a "'violation."
6 Id. § 2.02(3).
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recklessness, criminal negligence, is used infrequently; strict liability
generally is limited to "violations" 7 (which, recall, are distinguished
from "crimes").
Even if the actor has the required culpable state of mind for the
offense, criminal liability is barred if the actor's conduct is justified
because it avoids a greater societal harm. Such an actor is exculpated under a justification defense. Even if the actor has the required culpable state of mind and is not justified, criminal liability is
again barred if the person commits the offense because he or she
suffers a significant mental or emotional dysfunction. Such an actor
is exculpated under an excuse defense. Criminal codes recognize a
wide range of justification and excuse defenses, such as lesser evils,
law enforcement authority, insanity, immaturity, involuntary intoxication, and duress. 8
Some aspects of civil law may recognize doctrines similar to
these, but criminal law is unique in its reliance upon such a collection of doctrines which, taken together, serve "to safeguard conduct
that is without fault from condemnation as criminal."
While the notion of criminal liability as moral condemnation
may have public appeal, would such a criterion for criminal liability
leave society dangerously unprotected? Consider the problem of
the dangerous person who causes serious harm blamelessly, such as
a person who is violent because of severe mental illness. A system
of criminal law committed to personal blameworthiness would offer
an insanity defense to such a person. Yet, society is not left defenseless because civil commitment generally is available to incarcerate
such a dangerous, mentally ill person. But what if civil commitment
did not reliably protect society from dangerous offenders who escape the criminal system because of their blamelessness? Consider,
for example, a person who is acquitted of an offense because the
offense was the product of then-present insanity, but the actor is no
longer insane yet is still dangerous. The actor's dangerousness may
7 Id. § 2.05(2). The most notorious exception to the rule limiting strict liability to
"violations" is the common law's use of strict liability in statutory rape, a serious offense.
Modern codes commonly recognize two forms of statutory rape. The first form punishes persons who have intercourse with any person under age 16 (or similar age).
Here, criminal negligence is required. A second form of statutory rape punishes persons who have intercourse with any person under age 10 (or similar age). Here, strict
liability is imposed, typically in the belief that no one in good faith could mistake a
person under age 10 for a person over age 16. Where a defendant does hold such a
mistaken belief, he no doubt will be exculpated from criminal liability under an excuse
defense, such as insanity. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.1(1)(d), 213.3(1)(a),
213.6(1), 213.6(1) cmt. 2 (1980).
8 E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.08(4), 2.09, 3.02, 3.07, 4.01, 4.10 (1985).
9 Id. § 1.02(1)(c).
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arise from conditions independent of the former mental illness,
from the potential for reoccurrence of the mental illness and its accompanying violence, or from a combination of the two. How
should the law, criminal or civil, handle the problem of such a dangerous blameless offender? The answer to this question reveals
much about the nature of criminal law and its distinctiveness.
The problem of the blameless dangerous offender can be dealt
with in either of two ways. First, one might keep the criminal law
focused upon blameworthiness and expand civil commitment, if
necessary to take control of such persons. This approach maintains
a clear criminal-civil distinction, as that distinction is popularly conceived: criminal law would remain committed exclusively to punishment upon moral blameworthiness and civil law would provide
protection as needed through non-condemnatory incarceration or
supervision. A second approach would have criminal law, rather
than civil law, take control of such dangerous blameless offenders.
By convicting an admittedly blameless violator, this second approach rejects the exclusive focus of criminal law on blameworthiness and blurs the criminal-civil distinction.
The Supreme Court considered this problem last term in
Foucha v. Louisiana.10 Foucha, in a drug-induced psychosis," entered the home of a married couple with the intent to steal from
them, chased the couple from their home, and fired on police officers who confronted him. 12 He was held to be unable to distinguish right from wrong at the time of the offenses, acquitted under
an insanity defense, and civilly committed. He subsequently
regained his sanity but remained dangerous, according to psychiatrists. Could he be retained under civil commitment? The relevant
Louisiana statute provided that he could be retained if he remained
either insane or dangerous. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held the
Louisiana statute unconstitutional as a violation of substantive due
process.'

3

A majority of the Court appears to have chosen the second
course for dealing with the dangerous blameless offender: dropping the criminal law's focus on blameworthiness in order to allow
the criminal system to fill the protective gap. Justice O'Connor, the
10 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992). See Ellen Papadakis, Case Note, FourteenthAmendment-The
Continued Confinement of Insanity Acquittees, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 944 (1993).
11 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1782.
12

Id. at 1780, 1791 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

13 Id. at 1781. "[An insanity acquittee] may be held as long as he is both mentally ill

and dangerous, but not longer," Id. at 1794 (emphasis added). For discussion of the
substantive due process point, see id. at 1785.
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swing vote, is explicit about the approach. In her concurrence, she
reminds the states that they are not helpless to protect their residents from dangerous offenders who, because of the Court's decision, can no longer be civilly committed:
I write separately... to emphasize that the Court's opinion addresses
only the specific statutory [civil commitment] scheme before us....
This case does not require us to pass judgment ...

on statutes that

provide for punishment of persons who commit crimes while mentally
ill.
[The Court's holding] places no new restrictions on the States'
freedom to determine whether and to what extent mental illness
should excuse criminal behavior. The Court does not indicate that
States must make the insanity defense available. See Idaho Code § 18207(a) (1987) (mental condition not a defense to criminal charges);
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-14-102 (1991) (evidence of mental illness admissible [only] to prove absence of state of mind that is an element of
the offense). It likewise casts no doubt on laws providing for prison
terms after verdicts of "guilty but mentally ill." See, e.g., Del. Code
Ann., tit. 11, § 408(b) (1987); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, 1005-2-6 (1989);
Ind. Code § 35-36-2-5 (Supp. 1991). If a State concludes that mental
illness is best considered in the context of criminal sentencing, the
4
holding of this case erects no bar to implementing that judgment.1
In other words, if the state is dissatisfied with the resulting lapse in
civil commitment protection brought about by Foucha, it should
criminally convict the dangerous persons whom it previously had
civilly committed.1 5
No doubt Justice O'Connor is right in what Supreme Court
cases currently allow states to do: states constitutionally may use
criminal commitment as an alternative to civil commitment. Many
states certainly will follow her suggestion. Indeed, as I describe below, Justice O'Connor simply echoes a strategy that many states
have already tried and found effective since courts have begun imposing constitutional limitations on civil commitment. I will argue,
however, that such views of the interchangeability of criminal and
civil commitment blur the criminal-civil distinction in a way that ultimately will make our society more dangerous and less just.
I will argue that Foucha is both a troubling case and part of a
troubling trend because of states' predictable response to it. Constitutional restrictions on civil commitment, such as Foucha's, fre14

Id. at 1789-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

15 Criminal commitment does not require the regular showings of continuing mental

illness and dangerousness that civil commitment does; in this respect, criminal commitment is unconditional, at least until the date that the sentencing court sets for parole
eligibility.
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quently compel states to turn to the criminal justice system for
protection from dangerous persons who are insufficiently blameworthy for criminal conviction. And such reforms, which permit
conviction of such blameless persons, undercut the criminal law's
moral credibility. In that sense, decisions like Foucha carry a heavy
hidden cost; it is criminal law's moral credibility, I will argue, that
not only allows it to satisfy the desire to have justice done but also
gives criminal law much, if not most, of its power as a mechanism of
compliance. I will argue that the better course is to expand civil
commitment to include seriously dangerous offenders who are excluded from criminal liability as blameless for any reason, than to
divert the criminal law from its traditional requirement of moral
blame.
THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF CRIMINAL AND CIVIL COMMITMENT AS
PROTECTIVE MECHANISMS

Many aspects of existing law are designed to protect us from
harm by others. The threat of criminal conviction may be the most
effective deterrent, although the potential for regulatory sanctions
and tort and other civil liability also deter. For some persons bent
on harm, deterrence will be ineffective and incapacitation will be
necessary. Where the threatened harm is serious, incapacitation will
be achieved through incarceration. Incarceration typically is authorized through criminal commitment if an offender deserves the condemnation of criminal conviction, and through civil commitment if,
because of mental illness, he does not. With this traditional division
of labor, these two forms of commitment, criminal and civil, work
together to protect society from dangerous offenders.
Let me illustrate the interdependence of criminal and civil commitment with a brief history of the insanity defense as it has evolved
over 150 years to keep pace with expanding community notions of
the potential exculpating effects of mental illness. (The history of
the insanity defense also includes instances in which it was reduced
in scope because it exceeded the community's notions of exculpation. 16) In 1843, the House of Lords in McNaghten expanded the
16 See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc).
Brawner's overruling of the "the Durham product" test is the clearest example of this.
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled by United States v.
Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc). This kind of reform is not criticized
here but rather encouraged, because it promotes the community's respect for the criminal law as embodying their shared notions ofjustice.
In other instances, however, insanity defense reforms have narrowed the defense to
an extent that it fails to exculpate offenders who are likely to seem blameless. Illustrative is the recent federal exclusion of a defense for mental illness causing a control dys-
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insanity defense and more carefully articulated its criteria. Previously limited to persons having no more understanding "than an
infant, than a brute, or a wild beast," 17 the defense was defined to
include anyone who, due to mental illness at the time of the offense,
did not "know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if
he did know it, [he] did not know he was doing what was wrong."1 8
As early as 1887, the McNaghten test was criticized as failing to reflect the growing understanding of human behavior. Mental illness,
it was observed, can as effectively take away the power to choose as it
does the knowledge of what is right and what is wrong.1 9
In order to permit a defense for an exculpating control dysfunction, an "irresistible-impulse" test was added, which provided a defense to an actor, "if, by reason of the duress of such mental disease,
he had so far lost the power to choose between the right and wrong,
and to avoid doing the act in question, as that his free agency was at
the time destroyed. ' 20 In the 1950s, the McNaghten-plus-irresistible-impulse test, in turn, was criticized as providing too narrow a
defense by apparently requiring absolute dysfunction: requiring
that the actor "did not know" the nature and quality of his act or
that it was wrong or that his free agency was "destroyed. ' 2 1 The
then-current understanding of human behavior suggested that
mental dysfunction, both cognitive and control, could range over a
continuum of degrees of impairment. Prevailing notions of criminal
responsibility suggested that insufficient responsibility might be
found anywhere along the high range of the impairment continuum,
not just at its end point. The American Law Institute's insanity test
was substituted by many jurisdictions because it better reflected
these changed perspectives. The American Law Institute test refunction, no matter how severe. See 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1992). This reform cuts the insanity

defense further back than community views would have it. See infra note 32. The reform
was sparked in part by public disapproval of John Hinckley's insanity defense for his
attempt to assassinate President Reagan. But, one can argue, the improper result in the
Hinckley case, if that is what it was, came about because the existing law allocated the
burden of proof to the state to prove the defendant's sanity. Under this allocation, the
inherent subjectiveness and complexity of mental health issues worked in favor of giving
an insanity defense. Unfortunately, the public dissatisfaction spawned reform that narrowed the scope of the defense, rather than just shifting the burden of proof to the
defendant. (The reform also was sparked by concern for the release of dangerous insanity acquittees from civil commitment. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.)
17 Arnold's Case, 16 How. State Tr. 695, 765 (1724).
18 McNaghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
19 Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854 (1887).
20 Id. at 866. It also required that "at the same time, the alleged crime was so connected with such mental disease, in the relation of cause and effect [to the duress of
mental illness], as to have been the product of it solely." Id. at 866-67.
21 Text accompanying supra notes 18, 20.
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quired only that the actor, due to mental illness, lacked "substantial
capacity" to "appreciate the criminality... of his conduct or to con'2 2
form his conduct to the requirements of law."
In each instance of reform, criminal law doctrine changed with
current thinking, to exclude from criminal liability persons who had
come to be seen as insufficiently responsible for their conduct to be
blamed for it. Each reform was possible, without jeopardizing the
safety of the public, because protective jurisdiction was shifted to
the civil commitment system. Dangerous offenders who escaped
criminal liability under increasingly broader insanity tests did not go
free to maul a defenseless public, but rather were civilly committed
under a system that did not carry the condemnation of criminal
23
conviction.
The point is that the natural development of the criminal law,
as a system that imposes the condemnation of criminal conviction
only upon those who are seen to deserve it, requires a civil commitment system that will pick up the slack to protect the public from
dangerous offenders. One can conceive of further advances in behavioral sciences and further changes in public views on what makes
a person sufficiently blameworthy for criminal conviction. If the
criminal law is to be free to evolve to reflect such changes, it must be
free to exclude blameless offenders from criminal liability without
24
fear that by doing so, it leaves society unprotected.
Current restrictions on civil commitment, however, make it difficult for the civil commitment system to assure continuing protection from dangerous offenders who are excluded from criminal
liability as not sufficiently blameworthy. Indeed, it appears that restrictions on civil commitment have already caused retreat from past
criminal law advances, creating criminal liability for persons that
current community notions would hold insufficiently blameworthy
§ 4.01(1) (1985).
Most states have special statutes for the civil commitment of persons acquitted of
criminal charges by reason of insanity. See, e.g.,
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:8-b (1991);
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20 (Consol. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-16a-302 (1992);
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.110(2) (1991) and statutes cited at infra note 37. Occasionally, separate arrangement is made for the commitment of mentally retarded or "developmentally disabled" acquittees. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.005 (1991). For
examples of general civil commitment statutes not requiring a prior criminal acquittal,
see infra note 44.
24 Some people may suggest that eventually all human conduct will be shown to be
sufficiently caused by factors beyond an actor's control, that notions of blame will be
22 MODEL PENAL CODE

23

outmoded. See

STEPHENJ. MORSE,

Psychology, Determinism & Legal Responsibility, The Law as

a Behavioral Instrument, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 35, 50 (1985). I, for one,
do not believe that this will occur but, if it did and was generally understood by the
public, one might well argue that we should not maintain the criminal-civil distinction.
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to deserve criminal conviction. In other words, instead of the civil
commitment system catching dangerous offenders dropped from
the criminal justice system, the criminal justice system has been
turned into society's safety net for dangerous persons excluded
from civil commitment.
Consider, for example, the new verdict of "guilty but mentally
ill," which has been adopted by some jurisdictions and is under consideration by others. 2 5 The verdict replaces the insanity defense in a
few states; more frequently, it provides the trier of fact with an additional verdict in cases where mental illness is an issue. On its face,
the special verdict is to be returned where a defendant is mentally ill
but where his or her mental illness is insufficient to provide either
an insanity defense or a defense of mental illness negating an offense element. Upon a verdict of "guilty but mentally ill," the court
typically imposes the same criminal sentence that would have been
imposed had the defendant been found simply "guilty" of the offense charged. However, after such a verdict, the defendant must
be examined by psychiatrists before beginning to serve the sentence
and, if the defendant is determined to be in need of treatment, he or
she is criminally committed to a facility designed for the mentally ill.
Initially, one may wonder why the lay fact-finder in a criminal
trial is the appropriate body to determine whether an offender is in
need of a psychiatric examination. The jury reflects the community's notions of blameworthiness and responsibility. The issue of
the need for a psychiatric examination is a clinical one. Indeed,
most prison systems routinely screen for mental illness during their
normal intake and classification procedures and incarcerate mentally ill offenders in different settings than non-mentally ill offenders. 26

Why, then, would we ask a lay jury to make a clinical

screening recommendation that prison clinicians already make in
the normal course of business?
The fact is that the "guilty but mentally ill" verdict serves, and
apparently is designed to serve, a different purpose than to provide
a clinical screening judgment. The legislative history suggests that
the verdict arose as a response to court-mandated limitations on the
use of civil commitment. The Michigan statute, the first "guilty but
mentally ill" verdict, was enacted in response to public outcry over
25 See authorities collected at 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 173(h)

nn.93, 94 (1984).
26 For a description of the procedures for physical and psychiatric examinations of
new prisoners required by statute in Michigan, for example, see MICH. Comp. LAws
§ 791.267 (1991).
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the Michigan Supreme Court decision in People v. McQuillan,2 7 which
required that insanity acquittees be released from civil commitment
if they could not be shown to be presently insane. Responding to
public concern that the ruling would require the release of dangerous offenders, the Michigan Legislature promptly enacted the
"guilty but mentally ill" provision. 28 The Legislative Analysis of the
bill describes the "Apparent Problem to Which the Bill Addresses
Itself" by citing the Michigan Supreme Court decision and noting
the concern that "the release of persons acquitted by reason of insanity creates a potential threat to the public safety." 2 9
The operation of the "guilty but mentally ill" verdict is indirect
in achieving its goal of avoiding the release of dangerous insanity
acquittees. It works, not by making continued civil commitment easier, but by diverting mentally ill offenders from civil to criminal
commitment. With public skepticism about the ability of the civil
commitment system to protect them from dangerous insanity acquittees, a jury may pass up a verdict of "not guilty by reason of
insanity" in favor of a "guilty but mentally ill" verdict, not because
thejury finds the defendant blameworthy but because only the latter
verdict guarantees that the offender will receive needed confinement. The difficulty with the verdict is that it invites jurors in a
criminal trial to consider matters unrelated to guilt and blameworthiness at a time when those issues alone are before them. The use
of such a compromise verdict may do as much to undermine the
insanity defense as would its abolition.3 0
Some states have simply abolished their insanity defense, and
thereby shifted to criminal commitment persons who previously had
been civilly committed after a verdict of "not guilty by reason of
insanity." 3 1 Idaho, for example, repealed its insanity defense, in
part, out of concern for protection of the community.3 2 The state's
new law provides that "mental condition shall not be a defense to
any charge of criminal conduct," and adds a new code section di27 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974), superseded by statute as stated in People v. Ramsey, 375
N.W.2d 297 (Mich. 1985).
28 See, e.g., George D. Mesritz, Note, Guilty But Mentally Ill: An Historical and ConstitutionalAnalysis, 53J. URB. L. 471,483 (1976);John M. Grostic, Comment, The Constitutionality of Michigan's Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 188, 188 (1978).
29 MICH. HOUSE LEG. ANALYSIS SECTION, THIRD ANALYSIS OF MICH. H.B. 4363, 78th
Leg. at 1 (1975).
30 If effective abolition is the objective, it would seem to further the interests of informed debate and reform if it were done openly.
31 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-207(a) (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (1992);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (1992).
32 See IDAHO HOUSE OF REP., MINUTES OF JUDICIARY RULES & ADMIN. COMM., at 2
(Mar. 17, 1982).
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recting that mentally ill prisoners be incarcerated "in an appropriate
facility for treatment. ' ' 3 Thus, persons previously civilly committed
after acquittal may now be criminally committed to the same facility
to which they previously were civilly committed.
Still other jurisdictions, like the federal system, have narrowed
their insanity defenses to avoid release of dangerous offenders from
civil commitment. Citing, inter alia, the absence of a federal provision for the civil commitment of persons acquitted by reason of insanity, 34 Congress narrowed the federal insanity defense to exclude
cases of control dysfunction (a ground of exculpation, recall, first
recognized as appropriate for excuse by addition of the irresistible
impulse test in the late 1800s). 35 Many states have followed the lead
"

33 See 1982 Idaho Sess. Laws 368, codified as IDAHO CODE § 18-207(a)-(b) (1992).
Before this reform, insanity acquittees were civilly committed to the custody of the Director of the Department of Health and Welfare, if they met the requirements for such
commitment. IDAHO CODE § 18-214 (1972) (repealed by 1982 Idaho Sess. Laws 368).
34 See H.R. No. 577, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. at 41 (1983). See also Insanity Defense Hearing
on S.818, S.1106, S.1558, S.2669, S.2672, S.2678, S.2745, and S.2780 Before the Senate
Comm. on theJudiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1982)(Statement of Rudolph W. Giuliani,
Associate Attorney General). The federal government has now created federal civil
commitment authority. This was done in the same legislation that narrowed the federal
insanity defense.
35 See 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1993). As one witness before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary noted: "First, it is clear to us all, I believe, that present dissatisfaction with the
insanity defense is largely rooted in public concern about the premature release of dangerous persons acquitted by reason of insanity." Insanity Defense Hearing on S.818,
S.1106, S.1558, S.2669, S.2672, S.2678, S.2745, and S.2780 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 256 (1982)(Statement of Richard J. Bonnie, Professor of
Law and Director, Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public Policy, University of Virginia).
A congressman testifying before the House committee on the bill described a case from
his district in which the defendant, Russell Maguire, was charged with sexual abuse and
transporting a minor across state lines for immoral purposes. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Because there is no Federal procedure by which to commit persons acquitted of
a crime on the basis of insanity, Maguire was able to walk out of the courtroom a
free man. As one of the jury members said in a letter to me: "As it stands, the law
reads something like 'Alice in Wonderland,' but it is not humorous."
The administration's proposals on the insanity defense... would remedy these
problems....
... [I]t is incumbent upon those of us who make the laws to insure that in the
future our citizens are protected from any such distortions of the law.
I would urge you and the members of the subcommittee to act quickly to make
these necessary reforms to the insanity defense.
Reform of the Federal Insanity Defense: HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on CriminalJustice of the
House Committee on theJudiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 566-567 (1983) (Statement of Hon.
Rod Chandler, Congressional Representative from the State of Washington). See also id.
at 241.
The narrowing of the federal insanity defense might be defended on the ground
that, like Brawner's overruling of Durham, supra note 3, it cuts back on an insanity defense
that exceeds the community's notions of exculpation. This possibility cannot be entirely
discounted, but it seems more likely that the reform cuts back further than the commu-
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of the federal system in dropping the volitional prong from their
6
insanity defense.3
The same dynamic-altering the criminal justice system to compensate for weaknesses in the civil commitment system-is seen in
some states' attempts to abolish their "diminished capacity" defense, in which evidence of mental illness is used to negate a required offense culpability element.3 7 While most states have
procedures for automatic civil commitment for examination of persons held not guilty by reason of insanity,3 8 few have analogous procedures for persons acquitted because their mental illness negates a
required culpability element.3 9 Some jurisdictions have sought to
close this hole, not by expanding automatic civil commitment to include mentally ill persons acquitted under diminished capacity, but
by abolishing their diminished capacity defense. 40 Similarly, legal
nity view would support. Available evidence suggests that the community does recognize
an insanity defense for both cognitive and control dysfunction as a ground of exculpa-

tion.
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VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (forthcoming 1994). Thus, to exclude the possibility of
exculpation on either ground is to create the possibility for convicting blameless offenders. The federal reform, in my view, is an example of the kind of miscalculation that can
occur in the confusion created by a society's fear of the release of dangerous mentally ill
persons from civil commitment.
36 See, e.g., 1982 Alaska Sess. Laws § 42, ch. 143 (repealing the control prong of
Alaska's insanity defense, ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.083(a); cognitive prong retained,
ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (1992)); 63 Del. Laws 328 (1982) (repealing control prong;
cognitive prong retained, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 401 (1992)). See Daniels v. State,

538 A.2d 1104, 1107 (Del. 1988).
37 See, e.g., Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 83-84 (D.C. App. 1976), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 911 (1977) (evidence of mental disease or defect may not be introduced to

negate the culpable state of mind as an element of the offense); Johnson v. State, 439
A.2d 542, 549-50 (Md. 1982) (declining to adopt "diminished capacity" doctrine which
permits evidence of abnormal mental condition to negate specific intent); Bates v. State,
386 A.2d 1139, 1142-43 (Del. 1978) (rejecting, absent legislative directive, "diminished
responsibility" doctrine to negate intent element of murder charge); State v. Wilcox,
436 N.E.2d 523 (Ohio 1982) (rejecting "diminished capacity" defense; defendant may
not offer psychiatric testimony to show lack of requisite mental state). The United States
Supreme Court has not yet decided the issue of whether rejection of mental illness negating an element is constitutional. The Court denied certiorari in Bethea.
38 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983), authorizes automatic civil commitment after a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity" for a period long enough to
perform an examination of the person committed. Most commitment schemes require
that commitment beyond the initial examination period must be justified in periodic
reviews. See, e.g., id.; D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(e) (1992).
39 The jurisdictions abolishing the diminished capacity defense cited in supra note 36
had automatic civil commitment only for defendants acquitted under the insanity defense verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity." See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 403(a)
(1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d) (1992); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 12-111 (a)
(1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.40(A) (Baldwin 1992).
40 The Ohio Supreme Court explains its rejection of a diminished capacity defense,
in part, in this way:

1993]

FOREWORD

705

challenges and restrictions on systems for the civil commitment of
offenders judged to be "sexual psychopaths," have brought repeal
of such statutes in many states, leaving such offenders to be commit41
ted under criminal process.
In each instance, where civil commitment is made unavailable,
difficult, or ineffective in committing dangerous offenders, pressure
to criminally convict such offenders is increased. The resulting
criminal law reforms increase the likelihood that offenders will be
held criminally liable because of their apparent dangerousness, despite the absence of the blameworthiness. Instead of the civil commitment system serving as society's protective safety net where
[One writer) notes that '[s]eriously disturbed defendants can avoid an indefinite
commitment to a mental hospital for the criminally insane by relying on the diminished responsibility defense which frequently leads to a reduced term in prison.'
According to this view, the principle practical effect of the diminished capacity defense is to enable mentally ill offenders to receive shorter and more certain
sentences than they would receive if they were adjudged insane. Having satisfied
ourselves that Ohio's test for criminal responsibility [under its general insanity defense] adequately safeguards the rights of the insane, we are disinclined to adopt an
alternative defense that could swallow up the insanity defense with its attendant
commitment provisions.
State v. Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d 523, 527 (Ohio 1982) (quoting Professor Peter Arenella).
The Bethea Court offered a similar reason: "the future safety of the offender as well as
the community would be jeopardized by the possibility that one who is genuinely dangerous might obtain his complete freedom merely by applying his psychiatric evidence
to the threshold issue of intent." Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 91 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
41 See FLA. STAT. chs. 917.011 to .019 (198 1), repealedin part by 1983 Fla. Laws ch. 109;
IND. CODE § 35-11-3.1 (1976), repealed by 1979 Ind. Acts 294, § 1, 1979 Ind. Acts 87;
IOWA CODE §§ 225A.1 to .15 (1975), repealed by 1976 Iowa Acts 66; MICH. CoMP. LAWS
§§ 780.501 to .509 (1948), repealed by 1966 Mich. Pub. Acts 267, 1968 Mich. Pub. Acts
143; MINN. STAT. § 246.43 (1978), repealed by 1978 Minn. Laws 723, § 19, 1979 Minn.
Laws 258, § 25; Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 202.700 to .770 (1978), repealed by 1980 Mo. Laws
503; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2947.24 to .29 (Baldwin 1978), repealed by 1978 Ohio
Laws 202; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 14-2-1 to 14-2-8 (1956), repealed by 1969 R.I. Pub. Laws
238, 1979 R.I. Pub. Laws 293; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 8501 (1968), repealed by 1977 Vt.
Acts 219. See generally Elyce H. Zenoff, Controllingthe Dangers of Dangerousness: The ABA
Standards and Beyond, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562, 580 (1985); Carol Veneziano & Lewis
Veneziano, An Analysis of Legal Trends in the Disposition of Sex Crimes: Implicationfor Theory,
Research and Policy, 15J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 205, 216 (1987).
Similarly, the decision to waive civil juvenile jurisdiction in favor of criminal jurisdiction frequently rests, in part, upon the dangerousness of the juvenile, thus making
routine the use of the criminal system to protect the community where the civil system
cannot. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060(d) (1992). An analogous dynamic is seen in
the rejection of "civil" in favor of "criminal" sentencing options. For example, Wisconsin repealed provisions that had sexual offenders (after criminal conviction) treated and
confined by the Department of Public Welfare until they were no longer dangerous.
"Legislative concern that the Sex Crimes Act allowed parole of persons who might still
be dangerous was a major factor in the repeal decision." Marie Therese Ransley, Note,
Repeal of the Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 941, 953. The repeal means that
sex offenders are now to be dealt with by the Department of Corrections, as are other
criminal offenders. See generally id.
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criminal liability is inappropriate, the increasing restrictions on civil
commitment have reversed the roles. The criminal system is modified as necessary to protect us from the dangerous offenders that the
civil system does not, without regard to the offender's blameworthiness. Under this arrangement, there is little hope for further refinements of criminal law that will broaden defenses to keep up with
changing notions of criminal responsibility.
In Foucha, the Supreme Court appears to further reduce a
state's ability to use civil commitment to protect itself from dangerous blameless offenders. Foucha is a McQuillan case for the entire
country, and one can reasonably expect a similar narrowing of criminal law defenses and solidification of support for past narrowing. If
it was unclear to a jurisdiction how it should counter the danger of
releases from civil commitment created by Foucha, Justice
O'Connor's concurrence, quoted in the introduction above, 4 2 directs the way: abolish the insanity defense or adopt a verdict of
"guilty but mentally ill," and take account of mental illness only after criminal conviction, at the sentencing stage.
A better approach would be to expand civil commitment to include dangerous offenders who are excluded from criminal liability
as blameless for any reason. This would allow criminal conviction to
be reserved exclusively for blameworthy offenders without concern
that the community will be endangered by release of the blameless.
Civil commitment would be in all respects non-punitive in nature,
with incarceration or non-incarcerative supervision that minimizes
infringement of the offender's freedoms consistent with society's
protection. Commitment would be permitted only after proceedings in which the state demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the actor did engage in conduct prohibited by the
criminal code and is likely to commit offenses in the future.
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF THE BLAMELESS VS.
CIVIL COMMITMENT OF THE SANE

If the justification for criminal liability and punishment is nonconsequentialist desert, the need to limit criminal conviction to instances of moral condemnation is self-evident. For utilitarians, however, my objection to using the criminal law to commit blameless
but dangerous offenders presumably cannot be sustained unless at
least two propositions can be supported: (1) the effectiveness of the
criminal law in controlling crime is diminished when the criminal
law is modified to convict persons who do not have sufficient blame42 See text accompanying supra note 13.
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worthiness to deserve the condemnation of criminal conviction, and
(2) injury to societal interests would be less (than those I allege to
the criminal justice system) if the civil commitment system were expanded, as I suggest, to allow the commitment of dangerous offenders who are excluded from criminal liability as blameless for any
reason.
As to injury to the effective operation of the criminal justice system, I will argue that there is disutility in a criminal justice system
that imposes punishment that is not seen as deserved. First, the imposition of criminal liability and punishment that is not seen as deserved has a broader effect than simply the injury and injustice to
the offender at hand. Moral condemnation is an inexpensive yet
powerful form of deterrent threat. It demands none of the costs
associated with imprisonment or even supervised probation; yet, for
many persons, it is a sanction to be very much avoided. This marvelously cost-efficient sanction is available, however, only if the system retains its moral credibility. If the system is seen to convict
where no community condemnation is appropriate, the condemnation of criminal conviction is weakened. 43
An even greater compliance mechanism than the deterrent effect of shame and condemnation is suggested by recent empirical
studies. 44 The studies suggest that most persons are motivated to
obey the law, not because they fear being caught and punished (or
shamed), but because they believe in the moral weight of the law.
That is, most people obey the law, not because they fear the pain of
43 Note that only one of the two kinds of inconsistencies between community views
and criminal law has this adverse effect on the moral credibility of the criminal law:
punishing a blameless offender. The reverse kind of deviation-failing to punish a
blameworthy offender-may give rise to claims that the system is too lenient or too ineffective but does not tend to undercut the moral condemnation that would attach where
persons are convicted.
44 See THOMAS TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw chs. 3, 4 (1990). Tyler cites a
number of other studies that suggest similar conclusions. Id. at 30-39. Other research
supports the conclusion that a tension or contradiction between legal code and community standard has some of the consequences suggested. Studies show that the degree to
which people report that they have obeyed a law in the past and plan to obey it in the
future correlates with the degree to which they judge that law to be morally valid. See
also Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval,and Internalizationas Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 325 (1980); HERBERT JACOB, DEBTORS IN COURT: THE CONSUMPTION OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES (1969);
Robert F. Meier & Weldon T. Johnson, Deterrenceas Social Control: The Legal and Extralegal
Productionof Conformity, 42 AM. Soc. REV. 292 (1977); Matthew Silberman, Toward a Theory of CriminalDeterrence, 41 AM. Soc. REV. 442 (1976); CHARLES R. TITTLE, SANCTIONS
AND SOCIAL DEVIANCE: THE QUESTION OF DETERRENCE (1980). Tyler's recent study,

supra, comes to similar conclusions. The degree to which his respondents saw the legal

authorities as having legitimate power predicted their willingness to obey various laws
promulgated by those authorities.
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criminal sanction, but because they want to do what is right. They
are driven, in large part, by their perception of themselves as honest, law-abiding people. But the effectiveness of the law in gaining
compliance in this way is again a function of the law's credibility for
doing justice. If the law closely matches people's shared intuitive
notions of justice, it grows in its power to act as a model for their
conduct. If the law is seen as being unjust, its power as a moral
force is diminished. A society that imposes criminal liability on persons that the community regards as not sufficiently blameworthy
risks destroying this motive to adhere to the laws. It risks becoming
a society in which the only motive not to commit criminal conduct is
to avoid being caught and punished.
Aside from the added deterrent effect of the shame of conviction and the compliance derived from the moral credibility of criminal law, the perceived "justice" of criminal law is crucial to gaining
the cooperation and acquiescence of those persons involved in the
process (including offenders, witnesses, andjurors). Greatest cooperation will be elicited where the criminal liability rules and the community's views of justice generate identical results. Conflict
between the two undercuts the moral credibility of the system and
45
thereby engenders resistance and subversion.
If these arguments are correct, it would be better to limit the
criminal law so that only those offenders clearly perceived as blameworthy are convicted, and to extend the civil commitment system
beyond the commitment of the mentally ill, to include offenders
who are excluded from criminal liability as blameless for any reason
but who are predicted to commit serious offenses if released. Is it
possible, however, that such an expansion of civil commitment
would be more detrimental to society than allowing the criminal law
to punish blameless offenders?
One might argue that such an expansion of the civil commitment system would set a dangerous precedent. To give the government power to restrict liberty in such a dramatic way, with no prior
objective limit on the length of confinement, creates the potential
for governmental oppression on a large scale. This is preventive
detention at its worse, one might argue, for at least preventive detention ends when the offender goes to trial.
45

See, e.g.,
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(1988); Alan Scheflin &Jon Van Dyke,Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, 43 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 52-115
(1980); MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY (1973);
TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: UtilitarianTheory and the Problem of
Crime Control, 94 YALE LJ. 315 (1984).
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Certainly there are dangers in creating such civil commitment
authority but there is much that can be done to limit the danger.
Civil commitment of non-mentally-ill offenders could be limited to
threats of certain enumerated serious offenses, where the government shows 4 6 that the likelihood of future criminality meets a given
level of probability, where a given minimum level of confidence in
the prediction is met, and where these determinations are made in
conjunction with procedural safeguards analogous in many respects
to those provided criminal defendants: assistance of counsel, an evidentiary hearing, an opportunity to respond to the state's evidence,
and appellate review. (The process necessarily would be different
from a criminal trial, however, because a central issue here-the
likelihood of future criminality-frequently would call for different
kinds of evidence than would the issue in a criminal trial-culpability and responsibility with respect to a past offense.) In some respects, the procedural protections would exceed those given
criminal defendants because the process would appropriately call
for periodic reviews to confirm the offender's continuing dangerousness, reviews not needed for criminal commitment if the latter is
justified as deserved punishment for a past offense.
Still, some might argue that such a system, while justifiable on
its own terms, would set a dangerous precedent. But consider
whether such a system would break new ground. Precedent already
exists for commitment based on dangerousness' alone for mentally
ill persons; most jurisdictions presently provide for such. 4 7 In upholding the constitutionality of such commitment, courts have said:
46 One can appropriately argue for a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard (rather
than the criminal law's beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard). This is typically required
for current civil commitment. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). The civil
commitment determination here does not serve the same general-deterrence-throughmoral-condemnation function that a criminal verdict must serve and therefore need not
reflect the kind of strong consensus demanded by a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. Also, prediction of future events, the dangerousness issue, can never be shown to
the same degree of certainty that one can have as to a past event, the issue in a criminal
case. A beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard might well make the system ineffective as a
protective device. (On the other hand, if the ultimate issue to be proven was not terribly
demanding, even a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could be satisfied. That is, instead of requiring proof that it was probable that the offender would commit another
offense, the system could be effective even if it required proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that a significant possibility existed that the offender would commit another serious
offense.)
47 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-498 (West 1992); IDAHO CODE § 66-329
(1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:55 (West 1989); MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 123, § 12 (Law.
Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subds. 13, 17 (1990); Mo. REV. STAT. § 552.040
(1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:34 (1991); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.1 (West
1992); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.37 (Consol. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-5-312
(1992); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.280 (1991); Wis. STAT. § 51.20 (1989-90); Wvo. STAT.
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"There can be little doubt that in the exercise of its police power a
State may confine individuals solely to protect society from the dangers of significant antisocial acts .... ",48 Note that current systems
for the civil commitment of the mentally ill have less demanding
criteria than the expansion of civil commitment proposed here; they
do not require proof of a prior criminal offense as this proposal
does, but premise incarceration exclusively on a prediction of future
dangerousness.
Nor does the proposed expansion of civil commitment break
new ground in the commitment of dangerous persons who are not
mentally ill. Dangerousness is the rationale and the criterion for
49
special extended terms of incarceration for habitual offenders.
Under such provisions, an offender may be sentenced to life imprisonment for obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses, for example, upon
a showing that he committed two previous felonies related to credit
card and check fraud. 50 Some jurisdictions use dangerousness as
the primary criterion for deciding whether consecutive sentences
should be imposed for multiple offenses: "[A] consecutive sentence
should be imposed only after a finding by the trial judge that confinement for such a term is necessary in order to protect the public
from further criminal conduct by the defendant. "' 5 1 Dangerousness
§ 25-10-101 (1992). Not all jurisdictions have provision for the civil commitment of the
dangerously mentally ill. See supra note 16.
48 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975) (Burger, CJ., concurring),
quoted in State v. James, 534 S.W.2d 41, 44 (Mo. 1976).
49 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-604(K) (1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-501
(Michie 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214 (1987); FLA. STAT. ch. 775.084 (1991);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-83 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.010 (Michie 1991);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-17 (Michie 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-7-7, 22-7-8,
22-7-8.1 (1988); W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (1992); Wyo. STAT. § 6-10-201 (1992). See also
Am. Jur. 2d, Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders (1968).
50 Such sentencing was upheld as constitutional. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263
(1980). As one court explains:
[T]he sentence imposed for a subsequent offense [under a habitual violent offender
statute] is enhanced on the theory that the defendant's prior conviction of a violent
felony indicates the 'incorrigibleand dangerouscharacterof the accusedand establishes the
necessity for enhanced restraint.'
Tillman v. State, 609 So. 2d 1295, 1298 (Fla. 1992) (emphasis added). Another court
explains, "Our habitual criminality statute exists to enable the criminal justice system to
deal determinedly with career criminals who pose a serious threat to public safety."
State v. Sessions, 789 P.2d 1242, 1245 (1990). See also Rummel, 445 U.S. at 276:
[T]he interest of the State of Texas here is not simply that of making criminal
the unlawful acquisition of another's property; it is in addition the interest, expressed in all recidivist statutes, in dealing in a harsher manner with those who by
repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to
the norms of society as established by its criminal law.
51 Gray v. State, 538 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tenn. 1976) (citing Sentencing Alternatives
and Procedures, § 3.4(b) (IV), American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice (1968)).
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similarly is the rationale and the criterion for extended terms for
several classes of offenders, such as those determined to be a "sexually dangerous person." 5 2 Under a Colorado statute, for example, a
sex offender is committed to an indeterminate term, from one day
to life imprisonment, upon a finding that he "constitutes a threat of
bodily harm to members of the public."'5 3 The release decision for
such offenders similarly is keyed to the continuing dangerousness of
the offender. 5 4 Indeed, extended term may be authorized for nearly
any serious felony where the offender is found to be dangerous. 5 5
And many jurisdictions have their parole commissions make release
decisions for all offenses by assessing, inter alia, the dangerousness
of the offender. Typically, an offender may be released only if such
"will not increase the likelihood of harm to the public."'5 6
Nor is commitment of dangerous non-mentally-ill persons limited to cases labelled as "criminal." Non-criminal detention of legally sane persons has been authorized in a variety of instances in
which commitment is needed to protect the community. Statutes
for the detention of persons with a communicable disease are comSee, e.g., 725 ILCS 205/1.01 to 1.11 (Michie 1993) (originally enacted as ILL. REV.
ch. 38 § 105-1.01); see People v. Lovett, 600 N.E.2d 893 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (underlying conviction need not be for a sexual offense)); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403.1
(Supp. 1988) (extended term for those committing sodomy upon a child); Wis. STAT.
§ 975.12 (1989-90) (extended term for those committing crimes motivated by desire for
"sexual excitement"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-203 (1992) (indeterminate commitment
for sex offenders). Some jurisdictions achieve the same result through judicial decision.
See, e.g., State v. Barnes, 818 P.2d 1088 (Wash. 1991) (considering dangerousness as an
aggravating factor in the sentencing of sex offenders).
53 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-211(2) (1992).
54 The board is authorized to release a person "if the board deems it in the best
interests of that person and the public and that the person, if at large, would not constitute a threat of bodily harm to members of the public." CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-13216(5) (1992).
55 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.725, 161.735 (1991).
56 TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.18, § 8(a) (West 1993). See also ALAsKA STAT.
§ 33.16.100 (1986); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-701 (Michie 1987) (release when there is a
reasonable probability that the prisoner can be released without detriment to the community); COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-22.5-404 (1992) (the board shall first consider the risk
of violence to the public in every release decision it makes); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4347 (1987) (parole shall be ordered only when in the best interest of society); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 947.18 (West 1985) (no person shall be placed on parole until and unless
the commission finds that there is a reasonable probability that, if he is placed on parole,
his release will be compatible with his own welfare and the welfare of society); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 439.340 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985) (parole shall be ordered only for the
best interest of society); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 217-690 (Vernon 1983) (when in the board's
opinion there is a reasonable probability that an offender can be released without detriment of the community, the board may in its discretion release or parole such person);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-201(1) (1992) ("release when... reasonable probability that
the prisoner can be released without detriment to the prisoner or to the community").
52
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mon. 5 7 In supporting the state's use of its police power to detain

two women who were thought to have a venereal disease but who
refused medical examination, the Illinois Supreme Court
concluded:
Among all the objects sought to be secured by governmental laws
none is more important than the preservation of public health. The
duty to preserve the public health finds ample support in the police
power, which is inherent in the state, and which the state cannot surThe constitutional guaranties that no person shall be derender ....
prived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and that
no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws, were not intended to limit the subjects upon which the
lawfully be asserted in this any more than
police power of a state may
58
in any other connection.

In the same vein, many jurisdictions provide for the civil commitment of persons with a chemical dependence, 59 "not only for the
protection of the addict.., against himself, but also for the preven60
tion of contamination of others and the protection of the public."
Every jurisdiction has a civil system for the commitment of juvenile
delinquents. The justification for such commitment frequently is
"for the safety and protection of the public." 6 1 Commitment and
57 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 22-1IA-10 (tuberculosis), -14 & -18 (sexually transmitted
diseases), -24 (notifiable diseases) (1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1-650 (1992) (communicable diseases); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 505 (1983) (communicable diseases); FLA.
STAT. ch. 384.28 (1991) (sexually transmissible diseases); HAw. REV. STAT. § 325-8
(1985)(infectious, communicable, or other disease dangerous to public health); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 139.3 (West 1989) (communicable diseases); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-128
(1991) (infectious or contagious diseases); MINN. STAT. § 144.4180 (1992) (communicable diseases); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-C:1 1 (1990) (communicable diseases); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 130A-145 (1992) (communicable diseases); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3707.08 (Baldwin 1989) (communicable diseases); R.I. GEN. LAws. § 23-8-4 (1989)
(communicable diseases); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-5-104 (1992) (communicable or contagious diseases); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 143.05 (West 1989) (communicable diseases).
58 People ex ret. Baker v. Strautz, 54 N.E.2d 441, 444 (Ill. 1944). See also Varholy v.
Sweat, 15 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1943); Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir.
1973); State v. Hutchinson, 18 So. 2d 723 (Ala. 1944); Welch v. Shepherd, 196 P.2d 235
(Kan. 1948).
59 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 3000 to 3311 (Deering 1993); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 24-601 to 24-611 (1992); MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 14 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-52-50 to 44-52-210 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
60 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 3000 to 3311 (Deering 1993). Similarly, "The purpose
of [the D.C. Code provisions for commitment of those with a chemical dependence] is to
protect the health and safety of the people of the District of Columbia from the menace
of drug addiction .... " D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-601 (1992). Under the South Carolina
statute, the court is to be given reports on "the chemical dependency alleged, whether
or not the individual poses a substantial risk of physical harm to himself or others if
allowed to remain at liberty, [and other matters]." S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-52-90 (Law.
Co-op. 1991). See also MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-31-3, 41-31-5 (1981).
61 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-1.1 (1992) (defining purposes and goals of juvenile
court); ALA. CODE § 12-15-74 (1986) (such action is necessary to protect the welfare of
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release frequently are based in part upon the juvenile's dangerousness to others.6 2 Frequently, detention beyond the normal statutory
period is authorized if "discharge from control of the Youth Authority ... would be physically dangerous to the public." 63 Because behavioral scientists until recently did not consider repeated criminal
conduct itself to be a mental illness, 64 "sociopaths" or "psychopaths," as some habitual offenders are clinically diagnosed, are not
subject to the provisions for civil commitment of the mentally ill.
Many states, however, provide special provisions for the civil commitment of such persons. 6 5 Persons suffering mental retardation,
which is not considered a "mental illness" in some jurisdictions, are
nonetheless civilly committed under special statutes. 66 Committhe child or the public interest); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West 1984); Baker v.
Smith, 477 S.W.2d 149 (Ky. 1971).
62 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-71.1 (1992) (defining and authorizing the commitment
of "serious juvenile offenders"); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645.180 (Baldwin 1992) (physician may authorize convalescent leave of an involuntary patient only if he concludes that
patient would not present a danger or a threat of danger of himself or others during
such a leave); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-574 (1989) (when a request is made, the judge may
order secure custody only where he finds there is a reasonable factual basis to believe
that the juvenile actually committed the offense as alleged and that the juvenile is presently charged with a felony and has demonstrated that he is a danger to property or
persons); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-30 (1992) (officer in charge of detention or shelter
care facility shall order the release of a child unless he finds or has reasonable cause to
believe, for reasons of public safety, that it is not sage to release the child). The decision
to waive civil juvenile jurisdiction in favor of criminal jurisdiction frequently rests in part
upon the dangerousness of the juvenile, making routine the use of the criminal system
to protect the community where the civil system cannot.
63 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1800 (Deering 1993); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 120, § 17
(Law. Co-op. 1993).
64 See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 43 (2d ed. 1968). The current edition does recognize "antisocial
personality disorder," manifested in repeated criminal behavior. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 342-46
(3d ed. rev. 1987). For a discussion of the Model Penal Code's exclusion of such cases
from the definition of mental illness, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) cmt. 4 (1985).
65 MINN. STAT. § 526.10(1) (1992) ("psychopathic personality" is defined in MINN.
STAT. § 526.09 (1992) to mean a person who suffers
emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards
of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of personal acts, or a
combination of any such conditions, as to render such person irresponsible for personal conduct with respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to otherpersons).
MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 120, § 14 (Law. Co-op. 1975) (emphasis added); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-2921 (1989). Such civil commitment has been constitutionally approved. See State
ex rel. Pearson v. P. Ct. of Ramsey County, 287 N.W. 297 (Minn. 1939); Minnesota ex rel.
Pearson v. P. Ct. of Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
66 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-90 (1986); ALA. CODE § 22-52-55 (1990); CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 4426 (West 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-274 (West 1992); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 6-1924 (1989); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1926 (1989); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 3-820 (1989); MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 14 (1990); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 41-21-73 (1992); Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.203 (1991) (providing for civil commitment of
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ment and release decisions typically depend upon the retarded person's dangerousness. 6 7 Finally, pretrial detention of dangerous
arrestees is permitted in the District of Columbia and the federal
system if "no condition or combination of conditions [of release] ...
will reasonably assure the safety of the community." 68
Note that the preconditions for civil commitment in all of these
instances are less demanding than the requirements for civil commitment proposed here. None but the last-preventive detention
pending trial-require even a claim that the actor has committed an
offense; and preventive detention requires only an allegation of
criminal conduct. The civil commitment authority proposed here
would require proof of commission of an offense.
DANGEROUSNESS IN CRIMINAL GRADING AND SENTENCING

I have argued above against the criminal conviction of persons
on the basis of dangerousness rather than blameworthiness. The
logic of the arguments also may suggest that the extent of criminal
liability and punishment ought to be determined according to an
actor's blameworthiness rather than his dangerousness. This, of
course, would call for a significant alteration of current criminal law
practice. Noted above are many instances in which the criminal justice system presently uses dangerousness as grounds for longer
terms of incarceration: special extended terms for habitual offenders, consecutive sentences for multiple offenses, special extended
terms for several classes of offenses, and delay of release on parole
mentally retarded or developmentally disabled children); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.193
(1986); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 231 (McKinney 1983).
67 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4801 (West 1984) (the court may order the

release of an adult who is committed pursuant to § 6500 if the court finds there is no
longer a basis for finding the adult a danger to self or others); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTHGEN. § 12-113 (1990); Mo. REV. STAT. § 633.125(1) (release unless "the resident present[s] a likelihood of serious physical harm to himself or others").
68 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(a)(1) (1992); 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1993). Such detention has been constitutionally approved. As Salerno explains:
There is no doubt that preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal.... While the government's general interest in preventing crime is compelling, even this interest is heightened when the government musters convincing
proof that the arrestee, already indicted or held to answer for a serious crime,
presents a demonstrable danger to the community. Under these circumstances, society's interest in crime prevention is at its greatest.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747, 750 (1987). See also United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982); Kleinbart v. United
States, 604 A.2d 861, 868 (D.C. 1992) (post-Salerno application of D.C. preventive detention statute); Lynch v. United States, 557 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1989) (finding of dangerousness under pretrial detention statute must use standard of clear and convincing
evidence); State v. Simpkins, 826 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (post-Salerno application of
federal preventive detention statute).
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of dangerous offenders. 69 With qualifications that I shall note, I
support such a purge of dangerousness considerations from the
criminal justice system, if it would significantly enhance the moral
credibility of criminal convictions.
From this prospective, Washington State's much criticized new
"sexual predator" law, for example, is the ideal approach. The statute provides for the civil commitment of sexual offenders if, at the
conclusion of their criminal sentence (presumably based upon desert, not dangerousness), they remain likely to repeat their sexual
offenses.7 0 It permits minimum use of dangerousness considerations in criminal commitment decisions by relying on the civil commitment process to provide any additional protection needed
beyond the criminal term.
If restricting civil liberties is the concern, the Washington approach seems preferable to that of many states that sentence such
sex offenders to life imprisonment to avoid the possibility of release
of an offender who remains dangerous after a shorter term. 7 1 Oddly
enough, the latter scheme, life imprisonment for all sexual offenders, is the safer constitutional course for states, given the current
restrictions on civil commitment, which require periodic review of
both continuing mental illness and dangerousness. 7 2 The periodic
review requirement is not applied to criminal commitment, presumably because criminal commitment is justified as punishment for a
past offense, which provides no rationale for periodic review.
But this simply illustrates the deceptiveness of the present system. By considering dangerousness in setting criminal terms, the
state avoids the periodic review requirement that appropriately
ought to attach whenever dangerousness is the justification for commitment. But because the commitment is labelled as "criminal,"
and thus apparently based upon blameworthiness for a past offense,
no periodic review is thought to be required. Logic would suggest
that if the criminal law is not purged of its reliance upon dangerousness in setting incarceration terms, the standard civil commitment
requirements, including periodic review, should be applied to that
additional portion of the term imposed on dangerousness
73
grounds.
69 See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
70 WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09 (1991).
71 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
72 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (requiring periodic reviews of mental
illness and dangerousness for civil committees found not guilty by reason of insanity).

See supra note 37.
73 As noted above, in some jurisdictions, some periodic review for continuing dangerousness does take place, in the form of parole release decisions. But because the
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Except for these last comments, this Article generally has not
addressed the issue of dangerousness as a criterion in grading or
sentencing. It has focused on dangerousness as a criterion for the
initial liability decision, as in abolishing, limiting, or undermining
the insanity or diminished capacity defense. This has been the focus, not because the use of dangerousness in grading is unimportant, but rather because the use of dangerousness in making the
initial liability decision generally has a greater potential to undercut
the moral credibility of the criminal law than does dangerousness in
grading or sentencing. That is, it may be less of an injustice, or at
least perceived as less of an injustice, to impose greater punishment
than is deserved on a blameworthy offender than to impose undeserved criminal liability on a blameless offender.
One can conceive of extreme cases, however, where the punishment imposed on dangerousness grounds so far exceeds the punishment deserved that the potential for injustice or perceived injustice
is as great. Consider, for example, the crossing-guard convicted of
sexually fondling a child. He may deserve punishment; but a criminal sentence of life imprisonment, even if based upon a wellfounded prediction of future offenses, would hardly enhance the
moral credibility of the criminal law. A better approach would be to
impose the criminal term that is deserved for the past offense, and
to impose any additional liberty restrictions needed for societal protection under a civil process, thereby making explicit the dangerousness rationale and adhering to its attendant limitations, such as
periodic review.
CONCLUSION

I have argued here that it would be better to expand civil commitment to include seriously dangerous offenders who are excluded
from criminal liability as blameless for any reason, than to divert the
criminal justice system from its traditional requirement of moral
blame. Admittedly, such an expansion of civil commitment is potentially problematic. Most notably, behavioral science still does a poor
job in predicting future dangerousness. 74 This fact counsels caupunishment and dangerousness portions of a term are unspecified, two kinds of errors
are inevitable. Periodic review (in the form of parole review) might start too late, after a
substantial part of the dangerousness portion of the term has begun. Or, conversely, a
person might be released too soon, as no longer dangerous but before their punishment
portion had been served.
74 See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, A Preferencefor Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REV. 54, 74 (1982); Joseph J. Cocozza &
HenryJ. Steadman, The Failure of PsychiatricPredictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1976); Bernard L. Diamond, The Psychiatric Predic-
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tion. Nonetheless, it seems unwise for courts, as the Michigan
Supreme Court did in McQuillan and as the United States Supreme
Court now does in Foucha, to constitutionally restrict the use of civil
commitment to cases of mental illness and thereby compel use of
the criminal justice system to pick up the protective slack. At the
very least, by constitutionalizing limitations on civil commitment, the
courts prevent legislatures from experimenting with combinations
of criminal and civil commitment that might better preserve both
individual rights and society's protection.
One can hope that Foucha is given a narrow reading, as invalidating Louisiana's civil commitment scheme only because of inadequate procedural safeguards or because the nature or place of
detention (a mental hospital) was inappropriate (for commitment of
a person who is no longer mentally ill). Justice O'Connor's concurrence can be read to take this view,7 5 and her vote is needed for the
bare majority supporting the judgment. Perhaps a subsequent case
will give the Court the opportunity to reinvigorate the use of civil,
rather than criminal, commitment for dangerous blameless offenders. Such a course seems the only means by which the moral credibility of the criminal law and the compliance that it generates is
likely to be preserved.

tion of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 439 (1974-75); Edwin I. Megargee, The Prediction
of Dangerousness Behavior, 3 GRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 3 (1976);James M. Mullen & Robert C.
Reinehr, PredictingDangerousnessof Maximum Security ForensicMental Patients, 10 J. PSYCHATRY & L. 223 (1982); Henry J. Steadman, Predicting DangerousnessAmong the Mentally Ill:
Art, Magic and Science, 6 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 381 (1983); Franklin E. Zimring &
Gordon Hawkins, Dangerousness and CriminalJustice, 85 MICH. L. REv. 481 (1986).
75 "It might.., be permissible for Louisiana to confine an insanity acquittee who has
regained sanity if, unlike the situation in this case, the nature and duration of detention
were tailored to reflect pressing public safety concerns related to the acquittee's continuing dangerousness." Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).

